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 Our thinking about reasons for action, our recognition and assessment of them as well 
as our reflecting about their reality, structure, and authority, confronts us with a familiar 
difficulty. On the one hand, when thinking of and about reasons for action, we take ourselves 
as coming in relation with certain facts, which give objective grounds for, and impart a certain 
kind of necessity to, a course of action. On the other hand, we take ourselves as the subjects 
who intend, and are responsible for, that course of action, and regard the relevant reasons as 
reflections of our (purged, well-pondered) agential identity, of our commitments as agents.  
 This problem has been at the centre of contemporary practical philosophy and has 
been widely discussed along its semantic, metaphysical, epistemological, or ethical 
dimensions. The approach I want to explore here addresses it in a metaphysical perspective, 
by interpreting the reality of reasons for action in terms of certain general, structural and 
normative conditions on the deliberative standpoint and activities of agents. Internalism about 
reasons, on this reading, is a form of realism: internal, first order, or pragmatic realism about 
reasons. This view says important and distinctive truths about reasons for action. But these 
truths are somewhat elusive. My task, here, is to locate them, and, with them, to assess the 
real significance and the limits of the deliberative approach. 
      I 
           Internalist Realism  
 (i) Williams’ Thesis 
 To approach internalism we may recall some of the views advanced by Bernard 
Williams. In my opinion, his best formulation of internalism is the following: 
A has a reason to φ only if there is a sound deliberative route from A’s 
subjective motivational set (which I label “S” [...]) to A’s φ-ing 3 
 Without engaging in the exegesis of Williams’ texts, I take this as his final answer to 
the question he had raised in 1979 about the “interpretation” of “sentences of the forms ‘A 
has a reason to φ’ or ‘There is a reason for A to φ’”, that is, about what the “truth” of such 
sentences implies or what it takes for something to be a reason. Reasons for action here 
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considered are pro tanto authoritative reasons, reasons that pro tanto justify, or require, 
acting in certain ways.4 Williams’ account of internal reasons aims to provide a realist 
understanding of them, in the following steps. The starting point is an initial, and admittedly 
insufficient (“sub-humean”) version of internalism: 
(i) An internal reason statement is falsified by the absence of some appropriate 
element from S,5  
 This view would leave reasons exposed to the contingencies of the motivations of 
agents. The following constraints are then introduced: 
(ii) A member of S, D, will not give A reason for φ-ing if either the existence of 
D is dependent on false belief, or A’s belief on the relevance to the satisfaction 
of D is false.6  
 This constraint introduces, as a requirement, the truth of the beliefs that are relevant 
for the motivation to φ. This has an important epistemic consequence:  
(iii) a. A may falsely believe an internal reason statement about himself, and 
(we can add)   
b. A may not know some true internal reason statement about himself.7 
 This means that internalism (on the present account) is committed to the epistemic 
objectivity of reasons, that is, to the possibility of error and of ignorance about what internal 
reasons for action there are. But epistemic objectivity implies a further metaphysical 
commitment, that is, that the reality-appearance distinction applies to internal reasons, that 
there appearing to be internal reasons is not all there is to there being internal reasons. This is 
a fundamental tenet of realism that seems required by the concept of a reason; and that this 
form of internalism explicitly commits to it is a proof that it has realistic aims.  
 A further feature of realism about internal reasons is expressed by the following 
constraint:  
(iv) internal reason statements can be discovered in deliberative reasoning.8 
 The interpretation of this constraint is the crux of the debate on internal reasons. The 
constraint gives expression to the distinctive theoretical point of internalism (at least 
Williams’ internalism): the objective standing that reasons have vis-a-vis of agents, which is 
implied by their authority on action, cannot be conceived apart from the how they figure in 
the essentially practical exercise of deliberation.9 This connection has two aspects. The first 
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one is that the concept of a reason for acting involve that a reason is a potential explanation 
for an action; that, if an agent has a reason to do something, then it must be possible that his 
doing that be explained by that reason.10 Reasons, therefore, are objective and internally 
related to actions as explanantia to explananda. The second one is that, if it is essential to 
reasons that they have authority on action, they should give normative grounds for it. 
Reasons, therefore, are objective and internally related to actions as justificatory 
considerations are to justified items. On both accounts, reasons count as objective, real (and 
thus as something that can be discovered) in that and for how they figure in deliberation, 
explaining and justifying action. 11 
 Satisfaction of these constraints (epistemic objectivity, reality-appearance distinction, 
explanatory and justificatory inherence to deliberation) amounts to internal, deliberative 
realism about reasons. That is, to be real (and not merely apparent) as a reason is a matter of 
explanatory and justificatory success in deliberation; reasons are real within well informed, 
consistent, conclusive deliberation and against a background of practical concerns. 
Deliberative internalism is also a claim to deliberative, internal realism.  
 (ii) The Fundamental Insight 
 The link between the deliberative standpoint and realism about reasons expresses the 
fundamental insight of deliberative internalism. This fundamental insight can be articulated 
and assessed (again following Williams) in terms of the difference between saying that an 
agent has an internal reason of action and that he would have an internal reason for action: 
We can say that [A] has a reason to φ, thought he does not know it. For it to 
be the case that he actually has such a reason [...] it seems that the relevance of 
the unknown fact to his actions has to be fairly close and immediate; otherwise 
one merely says that A would have a reason to φ if he knew the fact.14 
 Here we have an interesting modal point about internal reasons. (The point is made in 
epistemic terms; but it can and should be generalized.) Internal reasons can be reasons an 
agent has or reasons he would have; they can be actual or possible reasons. The reasons that 
one agent has (the actual reasons) are determined by certain facts about his circumstances, 
views and concerns and by the inferential relations between these facts and certain actions 
which he may know or not. But such facts and such relations are to be relevant for his acting 
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in a close and immediate way, are to be such as to make a clear and present difference about 
what he is to do (given what else is true about that agent and his concerns and circumstances). 
By contrast, an agent would have a reason for action, on the ground of certain facts (of the 
same general kind as above), if such facts are not closely and immediately relevant for his 
acting; so that they would only make a practical difference, if other features of the 
circumstances, views and concerns were to change. In either case the agent may not know that 
he has or would have a reason to act; actual or possible reasons for action can be ignored or 
mistaken. And in either case, given enough information, the agent could intelligibly reshape his 
deliberation and intentions. What makes the difference between actual and possible internal 
reasons are real differences in objective circumstances and in deliberative significance. This is 
why this modal view is not aptly put in epistemic terms: It is a point about the modal 
robustness of reasons and of the thought of them; not a point about access to them, even less 
about their dependence on recognition. 
 Modal robustness, the thesis that a certain item can intelligibly be regarded as actual or 
possible, is a hallmark of realism. (This has to do with its having robust conditions of 
identity.) If what has just been said is true, as I think it is, internal reasons are modally robust 
and there is support for a claim for their reality. But, just because of its grounds, the reality of 
reasons is essentially dependent on the contents and soundness of deliberative perspectives. 
What warrants the thought of the modal robustness of internal reasons is the way their 
actuality and possibility is affected by normative considerations of practical, deliberative 
significance. The modal difference hinges around the idea of close and immediate relevance to 
action. But close and immediate relevance, in its turn, can be factorized, first, in features of 
the circumstances of action and of the views and concerns of the agent, second, in the 
practical significance of these features, how they ought to be grasped and assessed in 
deliberation. Modal robustness, therefore, is sufficiently accounted for, in the case of reasons, 
by normative properties (by the normative success) of deliberation. This is a claim of 
sufficiency: I am not claiming that this is the only viable conception of the reality of reasons. 
To establish this conclusion is out of the scope of this paper. However, the fact that reasons 
can be internally related to the practical standpoint and still have reality, not being reducible 
to any subjective episode, gives support to the present conception. (We will also see that 
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there is a reading, or a layer, of internal realism that makes better sense of a central feature of 
reasons than the alternative, externalist conception.) 
II 
       The Subjective Motivational Set Debate 
 I want now to discuss and dismiss two objections to internalism about reasons. Let us 
go back to Williams’ formula of internalism: A has a reason to φ only if there is a sound 
deliberative route from A’s subjective motivational set to A’s φ-ing. Two notions are 
prominent in this formula, sound deliberative route and subjective motivational set. Both have 
been at the centre of the discussion about deliberative internalism. I will begin by saying 
something about the latter.  
 Internalism has been criticized on account of its presumed commitment to the Humean 
view of motivation: Action requiring the occurrence of belief-independent desires, which lack 
representational content and function as rationally non-defeasible determinants of intention. 
There is widespread dissent as to whether internalism is really committed to this; and I want 
to suggest that there are no grounds for saddling internalism with motivational Humeanism.16 
 (i) Humean Desires? 
 Williams’ S is plausibly diverse, and in ways that make it clear that no strictly 
Humean conception of motivating states can be appropriate to it. S is rightly regarded by 
Williams as inclusive of all sorts of states that can plausibly figure in the intentional 
explanation of action. The theoretical role of S is to account for the reality of reasons (actual 
and possible) by determining whether the relation to action of certain facts (that might count 
as reasons) is close and immediate. But this role does not require, and therefore does not 
license, any restriction of its elements to beliefs and to Humean desires. 
 A weaker, or broader, form of Humeanism might still be defended, if the Sound 
Deliberative Route were restricted to instrumentally rational deliberation, to be accounted for 
in terms of the (best possible) satisfaction of desires that are ultimate for the agent. But why 
should internalism accept such a restriction? Rational deliberation can take all kinds of forms 
and starting points (some mentioned by Williams himself) that impose no constraint on the 
elements and structural features of S.17 The worry, again, may be that of losing the close and 
immediate relevance of what is to count as a reason for action with the standpoint of the agent 
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who purportedly has such a reason. However, such connection needs not to be forged by 
instrumental reasoning, and may even be deeper than deliberation (as I will try to suggest 
below). Therefore, it involves no (even weakly) Humean requirement about the nature of 
states that are the source of motivation, or about the way they are deliberatively related to 
intentional action. 
 (ii) A Rationally Improved S? 
 Internalism might be held to be Humean on a different ground. The idea that S is to be 
taken as given, that, for the sake of an account of reasons, is to be considered in its present 
configuration, may appear as a sort of Humean thought, and one that would bar deliberative 
internalism from gaining any robust understanding of reasons. The issue should be considered 
with some care, since there are two different ways in which the motivational set can be 
regarded as given, only one of them having Humean implications. 
  It makes sense to think that S should be individuated quite finely, and in a restrictive 
way (like it is usual with evidence), because a firm basis in assessing what reasons an agent 
has. Reasons are real (actual or possible), on the deliberative, internal understanding of their 
reality, only if the facts they seem to consist in can make some difference (close and 
immediate or not) for deliberation; and this cannot not be assessed, unless against a 
sufficiently well determined and fixed background of other practical views and concerns. But 
notice that this is not to favour Humeanism. Fixing the extension of the concept of an agent’s 
S to a given configuration of it, in order to make place for account of internal reasons, is 
consistent with holding this configuration to be defeasible, and to be defeasible on perfectly 
rational grounds. By contrast, Humean motivation does not consist in rationally corrigible 
states of mind, is not rationally defeasible. It is rejection of rational defeasibility of S, not 
reference to the present configuration of them, which would impart a Humean modulation to 
internalism. 24 
 Thus, internalism can very well identify S with the set of defeasible general 
motivational concerns that are present in the mind of the agent. What finds deliberative 
support in his present S is what the agent has reason to do (even though he does not know 
this, or is mistaken about this, or fails to be moved by this). But S, just as epistemic evidence, 
can be defeated by further rational consideration, as well as by new discoveries, by new 
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experiences, or by our own shifting attitudes. About such a case, what can be said is that the 
agent would have the corresponding internal reasons, if his motivational set were to be 
reshaped, according to these further rational considerations, discoveries, experiences, 
attitudinal shifts, so as to turn out as undefeated (but obviously still defeasible). But also that 
he does not have them, since what reasons one has depends on what is closely and 
immediately related to the given configuration of his agency. Williams explicitly contemplates 
that S can be modified in consequence of rational deliberation, and seems to hold that this is a 
requirement on an agent’s having an internal reason. This would be perhaps too quick. One 
could always advise the agent to improve her practical concerns. But she has a reason to 
follow this advice only if the present (unreformed) configuration of S gives support to her 
doing this; and there are no a priori requirements that this is so. 
 
      III 
    The Sound Deliberative Route Debate 
  Discussions about the notion of a sound deliberative route seem more on target and 
have focused mainly on whether the conception of rational deliberation that underlies 
internalism is in general sound and whether the theoretical role ascribed to the sound 
deliberative route can be consistently performed.  
 (i) Substantive and Procedural Rationality 
 Internalism has been criticized on account of its ignoring the distinction between 
procedural and substantive rationality.25 Procedural rationality can be understood in the 
following way: It is rational to φ in C, because it is the result of the correct application to the 
case at hand of certain formally specified patterns of deliberation. In terms of substantive 
rationality, by contrast, we can hold that it is rational to φ in C, because this is what, in the 
case at hand and when all is considered, is required by principles of reason that are specified 
in their content. The objection is that deliberative internalism is committed only to procedural 
rationality but that it either inconsistently mixes up the two conceptions, or fails to establish 
plausible conclusions that would require the substantive conception.  
 Matters are more complicated than that. Deliberative internalism seems to require both 
conceptions of rationality and to allow for them, by assigning them different and consistent 
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theoretical roles. Internalism cannot do without a conception of substantive rationality, if it 
has to make intelligible the authority that reasons have on the conduct of agents. If it is a fact 
that so and so is, for an agent, an all-considered reason for φ-ing in C, then φ-ing in C is the 
substantively rational thing to do for that agent, period. That is, it is rational in view of the 
content of the action and on the ground of a principle, an internal reason, which says that that 
action is to be done. The agent would fail in point of substantive rationality, if he did not do 
it, since he would not do the action that he has most reason to do. This, internalism is happy 
to recognize, as we can see by considering the following.  
 But, of course, it cannot be in terms of substantive rationality that deliberative 
internalism could and should determine the kind of fact that something is a reason for action, 
what makes it true that there is any such reason. The substantive conception of rationality 
applies only if it is the case that something (specified in its content) is a reason for action, if it 
is already set that an agent has a reason for action. But in order to settle what is to be a reason 
for action, so that it can be a real matter whether an agent has a given reason for action, 
deliberative internalism must have recourse to some conception of procedurally rational 
deliberation. There can be no ultimate appeal to independently given, content-determined 
reason-generating principles, in the context of a constitutive, internalist account of reasons.  
Therefore, it is not true that internalism fails to make the distinction between procedural and 
substantive rationality; or that ignores that certain relevant and important conclusions require 
the substantive conception. (This is not to say that it can provide such a conception; I will 
come back to this presently.) 
 (ii) Conditional Fallacy, Idealization, and Access 
 I think that deepest difficulties for internalism arise if one combines the idea of 
soundness of deliberation with that of a rational improvement of S. I have denied that such 
improvement is required by the theoretical role of S; but it might be a legitimate interpretation 
of the sound deliberative route. The internalist might want to say that reasons are individuated 
by how the agent would be motivated to act, were his S fully rationally improved. This, it is 
held, is the only conception of a deliberative route that might keep close to the criterion of   
close and immediate relevance, while still allowing reasons to be objective and real, and thus 
authoritative for agents. The problem is that, if a condition for there being a reason for an 
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agent to φ in C is identified with that agent’s S being rationally improved, so as to include a 
rationally non defeated motivation to do that action, we may fail to account, in terms of 
deliberative internalism, for his having reasons for action that it is overwhelmingly plausible 
he has. (This is the so-called problem of the Conditional Fallacy.)26 Any action that would 
make the agent more deliberatively rational (like: acquiring new information, revising his 
rational commitments, testing and improving his epistemic and decisional capacities) is not an 
action he would be motivated to do, if he were fully rational. It is because an agent is not fully 
rational that there is a reason for him to improve his rationality and that he can be motivated 
to do what would improve his rationality.28 But, quite clearly, in many cases an agent has 
reasons to do actions that would make him deliberatively rational, since such actions would 
influence closely and immediately, in a normative way, his deliberation. (And quite clearly he 
would have almost in any case reasons of that sort.) Therefore, if we identify the deliberative 
route with an ideal rational improvement of the agents’ S, we end by precluding them to have 
reasons that can certainly be ascribed to them.29 
 I think we should reconsider the whole idealizing approach to deliberation. Idealizing 
approaches get into trouble because they conflate two completely different notions. One is 
what is for something to be a reason: that is, stand in a close and immediate normative relation 
to deliberation and action, given the present configuration of the agent’s practical views and 
concerns; the other is that what counts as a reason for an agent should be effectively 
accessible to him, by means of a well-specified decision procedure. Internalism should not 
only make an existential claim, which (inter alia) has recourse to the concept of a deliberative 
route, but should outline a deliberative procedure that ensures that reasons are identified and 
accepted. But these are different concerns and should not be conflated. Internalism is 
committed to propose and defend an internal, constitutive thesis about what kinds of facts 
can be reasons. But it would be a mistake to equate this thesis with a thesis about what 
decision procedure that would ensure that agents recognize that so and so counts as a reason 
they have, or even with the thesis that there is any such procedure. This mistake leads to the 
idealizing approach: An idealized agent is well up to the task of recognizing and endorsing 
reasons; in a sense, he is a personified decision procedure. Now, it stands to reason that to 
accept the deliberative-internalist existential claim prepares us to expect that reasons will be 
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recognized, and that they will bear motivational weight. But neither recognitional nor 
motivational success is an a priori requirement for the reality of reasons.34  
 In alternative, we should forgo talk of idealized counterparts of agents, and consider 
directly what is to count as a sound solution to a practical problem, as a sound answer to a 
deliberative question that arises for an agent.35 Here is a proposal: There is, for an agent, 
reason to do what would be a sound solution to a deliberative question that is raised (in his 
actual circumstances) by his S. A deliberative question, or a deliberative problem, is such that 
it can only have solutions of the general form of an action. The point is that there are certain 
completely general constraints on what is to be a sound solution to a deliberative problem. 
One such constraint, very obviously, is that no pattern of action should count as such a 
solution if it would be inconsistent with the problem (it should be a solution to) even arising. 
Another, perhaps less obvious, constraint is that, in order to count as sound solution to a 
deliberative problem, an action should make some difference in regard of the alternatives that 
form the content of that problem.36  The first constraint, if observed, ensures that the 
proposed solution-concept, and the corresponding reasons for action, stand in continuity with 
what, in the agent, raises a demand for action. The second constraint, if observed, ensures that 
what generates a reason for action (the deliberative problem that action best answers) is 
something that can figure, for the agent, as the content of an action (something the agent can 
make true by acting). The two constraints, together, converge in assuring the relevance to 
action of the facts that count as real reasons. There are some advantages to this approach 
(apart that of sidestepping the problems that idealization raises: but the Conditional Fallacy 
would require a closer examination). We seem to have a firmer grasp on what his to solve a 
problem rather than on what is to deliberate soundly. By conceiving of reasons in terms of the 
normative concept of a solution we may be better in position to make good of the idea that 
reasons reflect objective properties and facts and conditions of practical relevance, and not 
subjective stances. Lastly, because of what has just been said, even if reasons are cast in terms 
of deliberative routes, it is still possible to think of them as detachable conclusions of 
deliberation; as independent from the acceptance of the premises. 
 I would therefore defend deliberative internalism as the right realistic approach to 
reasons for action. The deliberative conception seems to give us everything we may 
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legitimately want from a theory of reasons. Only, it does not.  
IV 
Practical Sense 
 (i) What Else? 
 The fundamental insight of internalism is that we can grasp what is to count as a 
reason for action only from a practical standpoint. This insight can be developed into a realist 
conception of reasons, given the appropriate, normative understanding of deliberation, or of 
the solution to a deliberative problem, against the background of the circumstances and of the 
views and concerns of an agent. That of a real reason is the concept of success of a well 
determined exercise of normative practical thinking. The conditions that makes practical 
thought correct are also the conditions that make reasons real. There is only a notional, not an 
actual distinction between these conditions. But, then, there is a further question to be 
answered, a question about what is for thought to count as practical and normative, about how 
practical thought can be objectively correct, about what is in practical normative thought that 
accounts for the reality of reasons.  
 Deliberative internalism, seen in the light of these further questions, appears as a 
radically incomplete theory. If it is correct to identify and explain the reality of reasons in 
terms of roles and outcomes of sound practical deliberation, this can only be part of a 
metaphysical account of reasons, since the relevant roles and authority (and the relevant 
conditions of deliberative soundness and success) are already assumed to be practical, 
normative; and this, in a way that has bearing on issues of reality. For instance, we have done 
up to now with an intuitive understanding of the close and immediate relevance of a fact to 
acting.  But we have not made any effort to clarify and vindicate the very idea of practical 
relevance, of what is for a fact to be significant in a practical way. Of course there are 
practically significant facts. We have daily encounters with them. And deliberative internalism 
may be well advised in giving this as the basis for an account of the reality of reasons. But this 
still does not explain how practical relevance, how practical thought are possible and 
intelligible. (This is a sort of transcendental question: A question about how some thought 
exercise, which is recognized as a fact, can be possible.)  
 (ii) Practical Normative Facts? 
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  To begin, we may take into consideration the initially appealing, but ultimately 
inadequate, idea of explaining practical normative thought by practical normative facts. A 
practical normative fact is, very simply, what makes true a claim to the effect that an agent’s 
φ-ing in C is what he ought to do. It is a normative fact, because it is a fact about what ought 
to take place. It is a practical fact, because what ought to take place are actions. It is a fact, 
because it is the absolute taking place, obtaining, of a state of affairs. The idea is that practical 
normative facts, just because of their being facts and the truth-makers of practical normative 
thoughts, ensure that thoughts of that kind have content. I have already suggested that in 
practical reflection and deliberation we are daily confronted with facts of this sort. What is to 
be considered is the further idea that facts of this sort are what makes possible and give 
content to practical normative thought.  
 This view might seem to be an appropriate answer to the above concerns about 
practical thought. Just as thought of physical objects, say, depends on what is physically real 
giving it its contents and conditions of correctness; so the contents and conditions of practical 
thoughts would be given by the corresponding, practical reality. (Possible thoughts depend on 
actual facts. Possible facts are facts thought of.) This view might then either complement, or 
(more likely) debunk the internal realist perspective on reasons. Reasons themselves might be 
fundamental practical normative facts. Reasons might thus come to be objects of thought as 
from outside - a position of externalism. This view has been forcefully put forward in the 
following way: reasons are normative practical facts and just that - facts, what is the case; 
they cannot be seen as contents, propositions, abstract objects, sets of possible worlds, and 
so on. 41 What is striking in this view is what I would call its purely referential character. The 
conditions and the constituents of the thought of reasons can be identified and vindicated as a 
matter of what objects, properties, and relations are there that combine in facts and satisfy 
and make true those thoughts. Therefore, reasons, as what practical normative thought is 
about, belong to the realm of reference, of truth-value; and the thought of them is simply a 
reflection of this reality. This is why extensional accounts of propositions, or contents, come 
to be considered, and rejected, as relevant alternatives to this factual rendering of what a 
reason for action is. The mistake that comes to expression in these alternatives is that of 
looking at semantic roles rather than at semantic values, at reference (truth-aptness) rather 
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than at referents (truth-values). But it is in terms of the same conceptual area (the area of 
truth-value, of what is the case) that we are to account for what it is to be a reason.  
 This approach seems to me to be fundamentally flawed.  To say only that practical 
normative thinking is made possible by its relation to facts that are practical and normative 
leaves unaccounted how the truth conditions of these thoughts are determined by their 
contents. And to identify the reality of reasons with the obtaining of facts misdescribes the 
sort of entity that reasons are. We should say that reasons for action entail the obtaining of 
facts, not that they are identical, or can be reduced, to them. (In effect, the very notion of a 
practical normative fact, understood simply in terms of what is the case, makes little sense.) 
To take the first point first. Two requirements can be legitimately made about the kind of 
thinking that essentially deals with a practical subject matter and that has normative import 
(with the kind of thinking that, in the deliberative realist perspective, can constitute the reality 
of reasons).42 The first is that, if thought is really to have practical normative force, it must be 
possible that things are as they are supposed to be, that is, that certain practical matters be 
the case. Practical normative thought is to be in general truth-apt, potentially referentially 
successful. This might be called the requirement of practical truth. The second is that the 
objects, properties, and facts that give truth-values to practical thought must be given in the 
appropriate mode of presentation; they must be so presented as to count as an appropriate 
ground of deliberation and decision. There is no other way thought can be meaningfully 
regarded as practical and normative. Practical and normative character consists in and is 
identified by relations of significance between thought contents and distinctive criteria of 
success, inferential potentials, and rational commitments. But these relations cannot be 
explained in terms simply of what makes true a certain thought, but only of what makes that 
making that thought true. The fundamental mistake of the referentialist conceptions of 
practical thinking is to ignore the theoretical priority of modes of presentations on reference 
and truth-values, in general and a fortiori in the practical case. (Intuitively, practical normative 
thought involves a more complex structure of modes of presentation than descriptive 
thought.) This priority cannot but remind us of the Fregean notion of sense. Thus, I would 
call the second requirement, the practical sense condition.  
 The mistake about the nature of practical thought is reflected in a corresponding 
mistake about the nature of its objects, of what it is about – practical normative facts, reasons. 
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It is a priori that reasons have practical relevance or significance, and that it is only under this 
description that they can be thought about and be real. If any fact is to count as a reason for 
action, it must be a fact in whose light agent could and should act; this must count as an aspect 
of its actuality. But if we try to identify reasons only in terms of what is the case, of actual 
states of affairs, we miss this important, a priori truth. Reasons, being real, or facts, certainly 
belong to the realm of reference, of what is simply and absolutely the case; but being reasons 
they can be what they are and can be identified only if they are facts, if they are the case, 
according to a conceptual nature; only if their obtaining in the real of reference is determined 
by sense-specifications. Reasons (practical normative facts in general) have a complex 
ontological standing, they are facts with essential aspectual, conceptual properties; they can 
be only because they are qualified in a practical and normative respect. If this requirement is 
kept well present, as part of what is for some fact to be a reason, we meet no difficulty in 
seeing how facts of this kind, consisting of conceptual specifications, can be the truth-
conditions for normative practical thoughts.  
 Therefore, the purely referential view of reasons is deeply misguided, both as an 
account of the possibility of practical thinking (which also underlies the deliberative-
internalist approach to them) and as a metaphysics of reasons. We must replace it with a 
theory of thought which is developed not only in terms of what is true, a fact, but also truths 
or facts being such only under a certain mode of presentation. Thought is practical and 
normative because of the way truth-values are presented; and it is only as entities constituted 
by conceptual specifications that the reality reasons for action is intelligible at all. From this 
last point of view, he deliberative-realist account, which assumes that reasons are real not 
outside, or abstracting from, but within the standpoint of deliberation, of practical thought, 
seems to be better placed to account for the reality of reasons.  
 
 (iii) Practical Sense and Internalism 
 Both truth-values and specifications of sense should be introduced as the fundamental 
dimensions of the possibility of practical normative thought. The relations between these two 
dimensions are those that hold, generally, between sense and reference. Sense determines 
reference. Normative, practical senses make facts be normative, practical truth-conditions and 
determine the corresponding thought contents. Reference does not determine sense. Truths 
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values do not determine alone practical senses, do not have per se practical relevance or 
significance, nor (by themselves) allow grasping the concept and the reality of a reason for 
action.  
 Recourse to the notion of sense gives us a different take on the fundamental insight of 
internalism. If the reality of reasons includes the appropriate, practical aspectual dimension, 
we can begin to see in different, non deliberative terms, their unique, constitutive link to 
action. (The deliberative-realist account remains valid, at its conceptual level.) Here the 
thought might be following. Actions have content, which consists in conditions of success, or 
execution, as well as in modes of presentation. Reasons and actions have contents with the 
same fundamental modes of presentation, which can determine the same sorts of semantic 
value and conditions of correctness. If this is so, it is not mysterious that the considerations 
that figure as the content of reasons can be closely and immediately relevant for actions, since 
they share the same kind of conceptual mode of presentation and have semantic values 
determined accordingly.  
 At the deepest level, the close and immediate relevance should be understood and 
vindicated in transcendental terms, so linking internalism with the conditions of practical 
thought. The same kind and structure of content which is constitutive of actions and of 
reasons for action, and which makes each of them appropriate, made for, the other, is also 
constitutive of practical normative thought. On the view of these matters licensed by the idea 
of practical sense, the truth of deliberative internalism and of internal realism about reasons 
springs from the conditions of practical normative thought, because it is involved in its very 
possibility. This may be going too far. What we can safely say is that the practical standpoint 
should be understood as a perspective in thought, in terms of sense, and that deliberative 
internalism can be really successful as an account of reasons only insofar as, and on the 
ground of, an appropriate conception of the kind of sense involved (one that underlies both 
reasons an actions). 44 
 This is not a position that can go to detriment of the objectivity and authority of 
reasons. Drawing attention to sense is making neither a psychological point, nor an 
epistemological one. It is not to lessen the objectivity of reasons, but to give appropriate 
recognition of the objective, and perspectival, mode in which actuality has to be determined 
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and come in view, if it is to constitute a reason. I think that it is only apparently that we have 
moved away from the practical standpoint of deliberative internalism. Deliberation, just as 
any other sort of pragmatic, first order standpoint, meets its limits when it comes to account 
for the possibility of practical thinking. Telegraphically: The practical domain is wider and 
deeper than the deliberative one. It is a domain of thought; and thought, which is neither 
merely subjective nor merely factual, has to be accounted for in the complex theoretical ways 
that are appropriate to it.  
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